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The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment:
A Primer on Free Speech and
Sexual Harassment
Jules B. Gerard'
Civil suits by women charging that sexual harassment in the
workplace created such intolerably hostile environments that they
were unable to perform effectively have multiplied in the past
decade. In every case, incidents involving speech were alleged or
found to have contributed to the hostile environment. Re-
markably, however, defendants almost never claimed that the sin-'
gled out speech was constitutionally protected. On those few occa-
sions when they did raise that issue, their claims were rejected
virtually out of hand.1
The United States Supreme Court might be partly to blame
for this casual disregard of free speech interests. When the Court
first interpreted and upheld the federal law that bans sexual dis-
crimination in employment practices, it made no point of the fact
that the law plainly implicates First Amendment values. 2 Some
courts relied on that failure to reject the few speech claims that
were made. Last year, in RA.V. v. City of St. Pau4' the Court
struck down a "bias-motivated crime" ordinance that bore many
similarities to the anti-harassment law examined here. The nine
Justices were bitterly divided about the reasons the ordinance was
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, each Justice joined one of two
opinions that hinted that the federal law forbidding sexual harass-
* Professor of Law, Washington University. Lisa Gitelson, Washington University class
of 1994, provided valuable research assistance.
1 See Kingsley R. Browne, Tile VII as Censorship: HostilEnvironment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481 (1991), for an encyclopedic survey of the cases.
This Article has a different focus than Browne's. It does not review the cases to deter-
mine whether they are consistent with First Amendment doctrine. Instead, its purpose is
to offer a preliminary survey of the free speech principles that are relevant to assessing
whether the kinds of speech that typically are put at issue in hostile environment cases
are protected. I have relied on Professor Browne's article for descriptions of these kinds
of speech. Although our conclusions are similar in many respects, they are not identical,
nor are the emphases we give to various First Amendment doctrines.
2 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
3 See Browne, supra note 1, at 512 n.191.
4 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ment, unlike the ordinance they were overturning, would survive
First Amendment scrutiny.5
On the one hand, then, the absence of free speech claims in
the cases and the implications that might be drawn from the Su-
preme Court's behavior suggest that the governing federal law
would pass constitutional muster. On the other hand, one can
forcefully argue that under established First Amendment princi-
ples, the federal law is invalid on its face. The law seemingly dis-
criminates on the basis of content, contrary to free speech doc-
trine frequently repeated by the Court and emphasized just last
year in RA.V. 6 If it exists, this discrimination does not fit easily
into any of the established categories of allowable content discrim-
ination.7 Quite the contrary. Many of the incidents that were used
to support claims of hostile environment appear to involve varie-
ties of speech that the Court, at one time or another, has specifi-
cally held to be protected by the Constitution. Moreover, the fed-
eral law appears to run afoul of First Amendment principles of
vagueness and overbreadth s Nor do there appear to be any es-
cape hatches through which the law might slip to elude these
indications of invalidity.9
Observing how the Supreme Court resolves these apparent
contradictions, which it will have to do before long,"° should
prove interesting.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Law
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it "an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, becausd of such
5 See i4 at 2546 ("sexually derogatory 'fighting words'") (majority opinion); id. at
2557, 2560 n.13 (captive audience) (concurring opinion).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part W.
9 See infra Part V.
10 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a hostile-environment case that
involved the use of foul and suggestive language. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1382 (1993). No First Amendment claim was raised before the lower courts, however.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20940 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.
4, 1991), af' 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
1004 [Vol. 68:1003
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 2 Title
VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,13 which autho-
rized compensatory and punitive damages and shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant in some situations.
14
These statutes have been interpreted to forbid two different
kinds of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" and "hostile-environ-
ment."5 Quid pro quo harassment takes the form of demands
for sexual favors in exchange for job benefits. Hostile-environment
harassment takes the form of making sexual antagonism so perva-
sive that it alters the "terms and conditions of employment" within
the meaning of the statute.
The free speech problems in the hostile-environment cases
arise not so much from the statutes themselves, but from the
guidelines" that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") promulgated to implement those statutes. These guide-
lines provide that "sexual harassment" is one form of the sex dis-
crimination forbidden by the terms of the statute. The guidelines
define "sexual harassment" as "verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature" where the "conduct has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment."17 The guidelines thus cover not only pure speech ("verbal
conduct"), but "physical conduct" that is intended to communicate
a message-so-called symbolic conduct." The Supreme Court has
treated these guidelines as authoritative. Indeed, the Court even
said that they afford employees "the right to work in an environ-
ment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
suilt." The implication that people may be protected from "ridi-
cule and insult" was especially dubious, given established First
Amendment principles.
12 Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
13 Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (Supp. III 1992)).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1992).
,15 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1992).
17 Id. § 1604.11(a).
18 Constitutional scholars call the problem addressed here "symbolic conduct" or
"symbolic speech." See genelly JOHN E. NowAK, & RONALD RoTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 16.48-.49 (4th ed. 1991).
19 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
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B. Preliminary Issues
A few matters may be disposed of summarily. In his encyclo-
pedic survey of the hostile-environment cases, Professor Browne
found only one decision that was based entirely on verbal con-
duct." The remaining cases embraced collections of incidents,
only some of which included speech. That fact is of no impor-
tance. The speech issue remains crucial because the Supreme
Court has held that sanctions may not be imposed on an individu-
al if there is a chance that they were predicated on protected
speech.2 Under these precedents, it would be unconstitutional to
impose liability if there were even a possibility that protected
speech was used to support the finding of a hostile environ-
ment. 2
Quid pro quo harassment, a demand for sexual favors in
exchange for job benefits, is a species of extortion, a speech-relat-
ed crime that no one ever supposed was protected by the First
Amendment. That form of harassment therefore is of no relevance
to this discussion.
Many hostile-environment cases are based on physical conduct
that has no significant speech component, such as an employee
awaking from a nap to find a supervisor's hand on her crotch,'
or being ordered to leave the door open when she used the bath-
room,24 or having her supervisor urinate in front of her.2
Physical conduct that legitimately may be made a crime is not
protected by the First Amendment,' even when it conveys a mes-
20 Browne, supra note 1, at 483 n.16. The lone case was Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). See Nell J. Medlin, Note, Fxpanding
the Law of Sexual Harassment to Include Workplace Ponography. Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 21 STETSON L REV. 655 (1992).
21 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. BRd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Street
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Sf NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982). Reasoning by analogy to discharge cases, if the plaintiff can prove that the hos-
tile environment existed without reference to the protected speech, a finding of harass-
ment might be justified even though protected speech was part of the factual matrix of
the trial. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 575. Note, however, that the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove that there was no reliance on protected speech. Id.
22 As a tactical matter, defendants should argue that incidents of protected speech
must be excluded from evidence because of the grave risk that substantial First
Amendment values otherwise will be impaired.
23 Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
24 Id.
25 Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
26 See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (upholding
[Vol. 68:1003
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sage, as when an employee's male co-workers "moon" herY
Hence these incidents are of no relevance either.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND FREE SPEECH
The Supreme Court has developed two distinct approaches to
the resolution of free speech claims. The approach used depends
on whether the government's interest (1) focuses on the commu-
nicative impact 'and the content of the speech, such as a regula-
tion of obscenity, or (2) focuses on some other effect of the
speech that has nothing to do with its content, such as a regula-
tion of the number of billboards.2 In one form or another, the
Court has said repeatedly, "If there is a bedrock principle underly-
ing the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
29
Under established First Amendment principles, a regulation of
speech based on its content or its communicative impact is uncon-
stitutional unless it falls within one of a limited number of excep-
tions to the rule that government may not prohibit speech be-
cause it does not like the message. A primary purpose of the First
Amendment was to deny government the power to censor speech.
Requiring governmental restrictions on speech to be content neu-
tral directly advances that purpose. If government could regulate
speech because of its content, officials could outlaw all speech on
whatever topics they chose and could suppress information they
would rather conceal or points of view with which they disagree.
The seminal cases from which the requirement of content
neutrality was derived illustrate how this concern over potential
government censorship provided the foundation for its develop-
ment. Niemotko v. Maylands° is representative of these cases. In
sanctions imposed on a prohibited form of labor picketing); cf. Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (closing bookstore where customers engaged in illicit sexual ac-
tivity raises no free speech issue); United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir.)
("[Speech] is not protected . . .when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.'") (quot-
ing United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1970)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 828
(1990).
27 Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
28 See infra Part V-A; see, ag., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNmTrurioNAL LAw 791-
92 (2d ed. 1988).
29 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding a flag desecration statute
unconstitutional).
30 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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Niemotko, Jehovah's Witnesses were denied a permit to use a public
park. The record established that other religious organizations
routinely were granted permits and that the official who denied
this permit was more interested in the Witnesses' ideas than in the
use they planned to make of the park. The Court concluded that
the permit had been denied because the government objected to
the ideas the Witnesses planned to express and, therefore, held
the denial unconstitutional. 1
This was an obvious case of censorship of ideas. Niemotko and
other seminal cases involved governmental attempts to suppress
certain points of view. But the requirement the Supreme Court
derived from them was stated in terms of "content" rather than
"viewpoint" neutrality. Although the definition of "content" in-
cludes the viewpoint being expressed, it clearly includes other
things, such as the subject matter of the speech. 2 A requirement
of subject matter neutrality differs significantly from one of view-
point neutrality. If, for example, the park regulation in Nieowtko
had denied permits to all religious organizations but not to secu-
lar ones, it would have discriminated on the basis of the content of
the speech (religion), but not on the basis of the viewtpoint of the
speakers. The Witnesses still would have been denied a permit.
The Supreme Court might still have held the denial unconstitu-
tional, but the reasons for overturning the denial in that hypo-
thetical situation would had to have been different from those the
Court offered in the actual case. As it was, the permit denial was
an example of viewpoint discrimination-this religious organization
was denied a permit because of its views while other organizations
with more traditional religious views were granted permits.
The difficulty here is that the Court has been inconsistent in
its willingness to distinguish "viewpoint" from "content" based reg-
ulations. The Court has also been inconsistent in reserving the
application of its stringent standard of constitutionality for view-
point based regulations.33 For instance, the Court overturned a
billboard ordinance that was viewpoint, but not content, neutral
without attempting to explain why viewpoint neutrality was not
enough under the circumstances or what free speech values were
31 Id. at 273.
32 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions on Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case
of Subect-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 81 (1978).
33 See geerally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the Fist Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L RE. 189 (1983).
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undercut by the ordinance's content-based classifications.34 Never-
theless, the Court regularly has upheld laws that were viewpoint
but not content neutral.ss
In principle, then, the Court continues to insist that the re-
quirement is one of content neutrality. In practice, however, the
Court sometimes will accept a viewpoint-neutral law as satisfying
that requirement.
That was the situation last year when the Court decided
R.A.V. v. City of St. PauLs' The ordinance at issue provided:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limit-
ed to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment' in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct. ... ."
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ordinance by interpret-
ing it to forbid only "fighting words," a category of speech the
Supreme Court has held is not protected by the First Amend-
ment.ss The Supreme Court reversed. The Court was unanimous
in declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but split five to four
over the rationale.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected the "fighting words"
justification for' two reasons. First, the ordinance outlawed only
those fighting words that were based on the topics of "race, color,
creed, religion or gender," but not those that were based, for
example, on the topics of politics or homosexuality. This content
discrimination against certain topics raised the specter of govern-
ment censorship of ideas and was thus invalid. Second, the ordi-
nance permitted viewpoint discrimination because it apparently
would allow those speaking in favor of tolerance for "race, color,"
etc., but not those speaking in opposition, to use fighting words
34 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
35 See e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981) (regulation of selling and soliciting on fairgrounds); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978) (regulation of "indecent but not obscene" speech on radio);
Mt. Healthy City Seh. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (regulation of
lewd gestures made to students); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(regulation of political advertising on public buses).
36 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
37 Id. at 2541 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 292.02 (1990)).
38 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), discussed at length infra
Part III-A. See genemiy NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 16.37.
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without limitation. And, of course, viewpoint discrimination is nev-
er permitted.
Justice White's concurring opinion disagreed completely.
White stated that "fighting words," a classification defined by con-
tent, was an unprotected category of speech because the Court
previously had concluded that all speech of that content was evil
and had no significant value. It therefore made no sense, White
argued, for the majority to agree that the entire category was un-
protected, but then to hold that treating subsets within the cate-
gory differently from each other (that is, banning fighting words
based on race but not those based on politics) violated the First
Amendment. All speech within that category was worthless by
definition and hence unworthy of protection. The concurring
opinion agreed, however, that the ordinance was invalid. It
reached that result on the basis that" the ordinance, as interpreted
by the state supreme court, made criminal "expressive conduct
that causes only hurt feelings," and thus was impermissibly
overbroad.
Whether the federal hostile-environment laws suffer from the
kind of content discrimination the R.A.V. majority condemned is
difficult to say."9 That they discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
which is invariably fatal, however, is not in doubt. The
government's interest in the hostile-environment cases is entirely
one of suppressing offensive or disagreeable ideas-"the right to
work in an environment free from ... ridicule, and insult."'"
The question thus becomes whether the speech can be said to fall
within one of the categories that are exceptions to the prohibition
against content discrimination.
III. PERMISSIBLE CONTENT REGULATION
There are four categories of permissible content regulation:
41
(1) the advocacy of unlawful conduct, a category composed of
39 There is an elusive quality about Justice Scalia's opinion in RA.V. He applies the
content neutrality command to the category of fighting words. It seems impossible to say
with confidence that one has grasped his meaning. For discussion, see Ronald Rotunda,
A Brief Comment on Politically Incomca Speech in the Wake of RA.V., 46 SMU L. REV. (forth-
coming 1993).
40 Mertor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
41 That is, four categories of content regulation that permit speech to be sup-
pressed. Another category, commercial speech, was created for the purpose of according
some protection to speech that previously had received none at all. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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cases that created two legends-the clear and present danger test,
and the aphorism about falsely crying "Firel" in a crowded the-
ater;4  (2) libel - and its relatives;' (3) obscenity;" and (4)
"fighting words.' 4 The first category, advocacy of unlawful con-
duct, has absolutely nothing to do with hostile work environments
and can be eliminated from the discussion without further ado.
Whether any particular utterance fits into one of the remaining
three specific categories depends entirely on the nature of that
utterance. It thus becomes necessary to classify the kinds of speech
typically found in hostile-environment cases.
For purposes of convenient analysis, they can be divided into
four classes:' (1) profane, vulgar words; (2) messages of hostility,
dislike, etc., aimed either at a particular person or at the whole
gender;4 (3) sexually suggestive messages, that can be either (a)
aimed at a particular person and range over a spectrum from
outright sexual propositions to lascivious leers or (b) undirected,
generalized messages of interest in sex and sexual activities (pin-
ups or dirty jokes, for example); and (4) totally innocuous messag-
es, like "[e]ven male chauvinist pigs need love," that at least one
judge thought were actionable!'
A. Profane or Vulger Words49
The leading case dealing with the public utterance of offen-
sive expletives is Cohen v. California' Cohen wore a jacket embla-
zoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse where
others were present. He was convicted of violating a statute that
prohibited "'maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or
42 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
43 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York TiLmes Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
44 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
45 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
46 Browne, .supr note 1, at 491-92, suggests two Icategories, "hostility message" and
"sexuality message,* that I have incorporated.
47 An example of this would be, "Women should e kept barefoot, pregnant, and at
home."
48 See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
49 This section is drawn from Jules B. Gerard, May Society Preserve a Modicum of Deco-
ram in Public Discourse?, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDER-
SrANDING 94 (E. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991).
50 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by ... offensive con-
duct."'51 In a five to four decision written by Justice Harlan, the
Supreme Court reversed.
Harlan began by observing that the conviction rested on the
words Cohen used, not on the underlying message. Focusing on
the words, he rejected three arguments the state offered to justify
regulating offensive language. Preserving "an appropriately deco-
rous atmosphere in the courthouse"52 was inadequate because the
statute was not limited to certain designated places, but was appli-
cable everywhere. Nor did the case fall within the relatively few
categories, such as "fighting words" and obscenity, in which the
Supreme Court had previously approved bans on certain forms of
speech. Finally, the conviction could not be upheld on the ground
that those who were offended by the words were a captive audi-
ence because they "could effectively avoid further bombardment of
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."53
A year later, the Court decided Gooding v. Wilson,' another
case involving the use of profane words. When police attempted to
stop Wilson from blocking the entrance to a government building,
he said to them, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you;" "You son of
a bitch, I'll choke you to death;" and "You son of a bitch, if you
ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces."55 He
was convicted of violating a statute that made it a crime for any-
one without provocation to "use to or of another, and in his pres-
ence ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause
a breach of the peace." In an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, the Court held that the statute, as construed by the state
courts, was unconstitutionally overbroad because it was not limited
to "fighting words" and was susceptible to being applied to pro-
tected speech. As a result, the Court affirmed a judgment over-
turning Wilson's conviction. 5'
A few months later, the Court vacated and remanded three
cases. Two of them, Rosenfeld v. New JerseyJ and Brown v. Oklaho-
51 Id. at 16 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (1968)).
52 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19.
53 Id. at 21.
54 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
55 Id. at 520.
56 I at 519.
57 Id. at 520.
58 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
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ma, 9 were to be reconsidered in light of both Cohen and Gooding.
The other, Lewis v. City of New Orleans,? was returned for recon-
sideration in light of Gooding only. In Rosenfeld, the defendant had
spoken at a public school board meeting attended by approximate-
ly 150 people, twenty-five of whom were women and forty of
whom were children. During his speech, he used the adjective
"motherfucking" four times, variously describing the teachers, the
school system, the school board, the town, the county, and the
country.6 The Brown defendant had spoken before a college au-
dience of both genders in a chapel. During a question and answer
period, he twice referred to some police officers as
"motherfucking fascist pig cops." Lewis was arrested after she
called police officers who were arresting her son "God damned
motherfucking police."62 She was convicted of violating a city or-
dinance reading, "It shall be unlawful ... for any person wantonly
to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language to-
ward... any member of the city police while in the actual perfor-
mance of his duty.'6s
The Lewis case returned to the Court two years later.' On
remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court construed the ordinance to
be limited to the category of "fighting words" and reaffirmed its
earlier judgment sustaining Lewis' conviction.' In an opinion by
Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, despite the state court's
attempt to narrow it.' Even though the state court had said the
ordinance was limited to "fighting words" and could be used only
against them, it had not given a limiting definition to the adjective
"opprobrious" in the ordinance. Because not all "opprobrious"
words were "fighting words," it was possible to apply the statute to
protected speech.
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these cases
is that it violates the First Amendment to base a finding of a hos-
tile environment on the use of expletives. This is unfortunate
because Cohen and its progeny are especially unpersuasive exercises
59 408 U.S. 914 (1972).




64 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
65 Id. at 130.
66 Id. at 134.
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in constitutional interpretation. The fundamental issue they raise
is whether government, in order to foster an environment of de-
cency and civility, to promote the orderly administration of public
affairs, and to protect the sensibilities of citizens from unprovoked
and despicable abuse, may regulate the public utterance of words
universally regarded as offensive; or whether instead the First
Amendment forbids any such governmental activity.
The usual rule, Harlan said in Cohen, was that "governmental
bodies may not prescribe the form or the content of individual
expression."6 A regulation of speech aimed at certain words is,
on its face at least, one based on "content" as that word is nor-
mally understood. However, as pointed out earlier,' the Court's
antipathy for "content" regulations was originally designed to block
governments from censoring ideas or "viewpoints." The First
Amendment was intended, in other words, to prevent governments
from favoring one side of an argument by suppressing the other
side(s). In this sense, a regulation of the use of certain words
arguably is not a "content" regulation at all because it regulates all
points of view evenhandedly and is thus "viewpoint neutral.'
Central to Harlan's thesis in Cohen was the argument that the
words prohibited by the California statute did not fall within any
of the "established categories" of permissible content regulation.
He mentioned two such categories: obscenity and "fighting
words." ° The words prohibited by the statute clearly were not
"obscene" as the Supreme Court has defined that term.7 1 The
,other category requires closer examination.
The notion that "fighting words" may be banned stems from
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,72 a case decided in 1942. Chaplinsky
was a Jehovah's Witness who was distributing literature and de-
nouncing organized religion as a racket. Citizens complained to
67 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
68 See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
69 See generally Stone, supra note 32.
The Court has been erratic, to put it mildly, in its willingness to distinguish "view-
point" from "content' based regulations and to reserve the application of its stringent
standard for the former. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981) (stringent standard applied to overturn a viewpoint neutral regulation of bill-
boards with certain content) with Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (stringent standard not applied to viewpoint neutral regulation
of solicitation-manifestly a content-based classification-on state fairgrounds). See Stone,
supra note 32.
70 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
71 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see ao infra Part III-C.
72 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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the city marshall, Bowering, who told them Chaplinsky was within
his rights, but also warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting
restless. A disturbance occurred later and a traffic officer on the
scene began escorting Chaplinsky to the police station, although
he apparently had not arrested him. On the way they met
Bowering, who had been told a riot was in progress. Chaplinsky
admitted saying to Bowering (except he denied invoking the Dei-
ty), "'You are a God damned racketeer,'" and "'a damned Fascist
and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascists. ' " s Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a statute that
provided,
"No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name,
nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hear-
ing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent
him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation. "'
In affirming Chaplinsky's conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court said,
' Lhe word 'offensive' [in the statute] is not to be defined in
terms of what a particular addressee thinks .... The test is
what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight .... The
English language has a number of words and expressions which
by general consent are 'fighting words' when said without a
disarming smile .... The statute ... does no more than pro-
hibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of
the peace by the addressee."7
The United States Supreme Court held the statute constitutional
as so construed. Up to this point Harlan's opinion in Cohen is
again correct. The words on Cohen's jacket were not addressed to
anyone in particular, nor were they uttered in a face-to-face situa-
tion; hence they were not the kind of "fighting words" that were
at issue in Chaplinsky. But that is not the whole story.
The issue, as Harlan himself defined it, was not whether
Cohen's utterance was "fighting words," but whether it fell into
any "established category" of speech that could be banned because
73 Id. at 568.
74 Id. at 569.
75 Id. at 573 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941)).
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of the words used. On that point, the Chaplinsky opinion, which
was written by Justice Murphy, a known champion of the First
Amendment,76 delivers a message quite different from the one
Harlan drew from it. Before analyzing the terms of the New
Hampshire statute, Murphy said:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as
a criminal act would raise no question under that instru-
ment."77
Murphy plainly said that among the categories of public speech
that may be punished without raising constitutional problems are
the lewd and the profane, "those which by their very utterance
inflict injury." That he used the disjunctive in his summary-"those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace"--proves that he was speaking of
more than just "fighting words."8 Harlan simply ignored the ob-
vious meaning of Murphy's statement.
76 Se, ag., CATHEUNE A. BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT: PROFILES OF THE
justncEs 115 (1978).
77 Chapinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added). The last sentence is a quotation
from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
78 I recognize, of course, that Murphy may have been using "lewd" and "obscene" as
synonyms to cover only one category. But the Court's first effort to define obscenity
came more than fifteen years after Murphy's opinion in Chapinshy. Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957). It was only with Harlan's'opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971), itself that the gloss on the Court's definition-that obscenity "must be, in
some significant way, erotic"-was added. Id. at 20. Thus it is arguable that, at the time
Murphy wrote, the public utterance of simple sexual expletives could be punished even if
they did not meet the Court's subsequently announced criteria for obscenity. I believe
this to be the more persuasive reading of Chaplinky, and justifies the textual statement
that lewd words constitute a distinct category. Accord GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONs"I-
TUTIONAL LAW 1233 (2d ed. 1991).
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Nor can it be doubted that Murphy's conclusion-that the
public utterance of lewd and profane words may constitutionally
be punished-was correct at the time he stated it. When the First
Amendment was proposed and ratified, and when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, laws forbidding such public utterances
were common.' Indeed, until Cohen, no one seems to have
doubted society's authority to" ban them. Uncharacteristically,
Harlan made no investigation of this historical background.
Harlan then moved to the three "particularized consider-
ations" that he argued required the reversal of Cohen's conviction.
The first of these was the "stopping point" argument. "[N]o readi-
ly ascertainable general principle exists," Harlan argued, by which
to distinguish one offensive word from another.' "How is one to
distinguish this from any other offensive word?""' he asked rhe-
torically. One answer is to point out that the comedian George
Carlin, in his "Filthy Words" monologue, seemed to have little
trouble identifying "the cuss words and the words that you can't
say." 2 When I was growing up, the word "fuck" was not in even
the unabridged dictionary. The editors of that work apparently did
not find it impossible to distinguish that word from others. If
comedians and dictionary editors can distinguish the unspeakable
from the merely offensive, surely judges and lawyers can too.
"Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked," Justice Holmes once remarked.'
At this point Harlan used language that has become a virtual
First Amendment proverb as well as his epitaph:'M "[I]t is never-
theless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."' I
79 See Roth, 354 U.S. 482-83:
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States
which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection to ev-
ery utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel,
and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory
crimes. As early as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish "any filthy,
obscene, or profane iong, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon" .... Thus, profani-
ty and obscenity were related offenses.
Id (footnotes and citation omitted).
80 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
81 Id.
82 As quoted in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978).
83 OuvmV W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
84 Even short biographical sketches of Harlan include it. See, g., STONE Er AT-,
supra note 78, at xiii.
85 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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have been puzzling over that sentence for more then twenty years,
and still am uncertain what Harlan meant by it. Assuming he
intended it to be taken literally, it is meaningless. With equal
force and equivalent grace, one might say, "One man's obscenity is
another's lyric." It has been known for some time that many peo-
ple find obscenity attractive and stimulating, but that surely should
not be accepted as a legitimate reason for invalidating obscenity
regulations. As an explanation for-overturning regulations of offen-
sive speech in public, Harlan's beguiling epigram is a nullity.
Perhaps he meant only that some people are unaware that
others regard certain words as profane. That is true. As a teenag-
er, I worked on a railroad section gang that employed a father
and his son who were recent immigrants from West Virginia. I
remember laughing uproariously when the father once ordered his
son to "stop that shitten cussing." Later, after reading Chaucer in
college, I discovered that "shitten" is a Middle English word that
meant "dirty" or "filthy.' as I also learned that scholars believe
that long-time residents of isolated rural and mountainous areas,
like this father and son, retain aspects of Elizabethan or earlier
English in their speech. 7 But if that is all he meant, Harlan
could have waited for a case in which the speaker was genuinely
surprised that others considered his words to be offensive.
Harlan's second "particularized consideration" was that the
Constitution protects the emotive as well as the cognitive element
of speech. "We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated. "a Here again Harlan over-
stated the case.' The issue was not whether the Constitution "has
86 In modem translation, lines 503-04 of the "Prologue" to the Canterbury Tales read.:
And shame it is to see-let priests take stock-
A shitten shepherd and a snowy flock.
GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES 38 (Nevill Coghill trans., 1951).
In the original, they appear.
And shame it is, if a prest take keep,
A shiten shepherde and a clene sheep.
GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE POETICAL WORKS OF CHAUCER 24 (Fred N. Robinson ed., 1933).
87 See H.L MENCEN, THE AMER CAN LANGUAGE 124-29 (4th ed. 1947); THOMAS
PYLEs, WORDS AND WAYS OF AMERICAN ENGUSH 22-28 (1952).
88 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
89 "Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
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little or no regard" for the emotive element of speech. The issue
rather was whether society must tolerate being confronted by
words deliberately chosen for their offensiveness just because Co-
hen found that to be a convenient way to communicate his emo-
tions.
Harlan tells us in Cohen that, absent more particularized and
compelling reasons than that the audience is captive and contains
women and children, "the simple public display . .. of this four-
letter expletive" may not be made a crime.' This statement must
mean that "Fuck the Draft" could also be displayed on bumper
stickers, placards carried on sidewalks, and even on billboards.
Inevitably, it must mean that the word "fuck," and others like it,
can be used in the workplace.
Harlan's final "particularized consideration" addressed the
point of suppressing ideas under the guise of regulating offensive
language. "[G]overnments might soon seize upon the censorship
of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expres-
sion of unpopular views," he suggested. Of course it is theoreti-
cally possible that allowing government to forbid the public utter-
ance of a few specific words might result in suppressing ideas.
Banning the display of the swastika, for example, would make it
harder to communicate all the evil messages associated with that
hated symbol.92 Like the swastika, words are only symbols. But it
will take more than unsupported assertions, even from someone as
revered as Harlan, to persuade me that the danger is more than
trivial. I grew up, as did Harlan, in a generation in which those
words were never used in public and were rarely used in print. I
cannot think of a single idea to which I was denied access by the
fact that these words were not used. Nor can I think of a single
idea I have learned since, my understanding of which depended
on, or was even facilitated by, the use of offensive language.
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us." Id. at 25. But Cohen obviously!
had nothing to do with grammatical squeamishness.
If society had the power to regulate on the basis of grammatical squeamishness,
radio and television sports programs would be abolished completely because of the atrod-
ties they regularly perpetrate on the English language. My current favorite example co-
mes from KMOX radio in St. Louis: "Stay tuned for Mike and I's sports open line."
90 Id. at 26.
91 Id.
92 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), at. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
For compelling commentary on the Skokie Controversy, see Frederick Schauer, Hany
Keiven and the Perils of Paytilarism 56 U. CHI. L REV. 397 (1989); Lee C. Bollinger,
Defending my Enemy, 80 MiCH. L REV. 617 (1982) (book review).-
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An example from another medium may make the point more
effectively. Consider the episode of what some feminists today
would call marital rape from Gone With The Wind. Clark Gable
seizes Vivien Leigh and carries her in his arms up the huge stair-
case, two steps at a time. The next scene is the following morning
and shows Leigh in bed-alone. If that sequence were remade
today, I have no doubt we would be offered all of the sounds and
most of the sights of orgasmic copulation. But the movie would
not be one wit more comprehensible if the scene I have suggested
were to be added to it.'
Of course it is possible, as Harlan suggested, that the ideologi-
cal content of a message might be jeopardized by an impermissibly
expansive view of what language is offensive. But there will be
time enough for the Court to decide that case when-and if-it
arises.
In contrast to Cohen, which is merely unpersuasive, the Court's
opinions in Gooding v. W/son? and the cases relying on it are
indefensible. Whether one compares the words used or the legisla-
tion involved in Chaplinsky with the same feature of the later cases,
the resulting differences are either trivial or non-existent, and all
of them cut in favor of sustaining the convictions rather than
reversing them. The later decisions amount simply to a covert
overruling of Chaplinsky. They do not address the issues discussed
in Chaplinsky or attempt to explain why that unanimous opinion
by a known advocate of free speech values was defective.
By deciding Cohen and its progeny differently, the Supreme
Court could have laid a foundation on which to build a prohibi-
tion against the use of scatologically abusive words in the
workplace. Such a ban would not have put the government on
one side of a contentious issue. In other words, this type of ban
would not have violated the principle of viewpoint neutrality be-
cause it would not have materially hindered the communication of
any messages or put legitimate free speech values at significant
risk. But the ohen-Gooding line of cases remains on the books.
There is no way to avoid the conclusion that basing a finding of a
hostile environment on the use of profane words violates the First
93 Perhaps I should add, for the benefit of younger readers, that the movie did
cause something of a scandal when it was released in 1939. That was because of Gable's
final bit of dialogue: "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn." "Damn" was a word one
just did not then use in public. There was at least one exception, based, not surprisingly,
on patriotism: "Damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead."
94 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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Amendment, unless women for some reason are entitled to great-
er protection against foul language in the workplace than they are
on the streets, in courthouses, in college chapels, or at school
board meetings.' Moreover, unless Cohen is overruled, the only
reason for protecting women, but not men, from foul language in
the workplace would be an assumption that women are-what?
more sensitive? offended? But isn't that the kind of stereotypical
thinking these laws were supposed to overcome?
B. Messages of Hostility
Messages of hostility may be directed at a particular person
(e.g., "You lousy bitch.") or at a larger group, including an entire
gender (e.g., "All women are whores."). The Cohen gloss on the
obscenity standard" makes it clear that neither variety of hostile
message falls within that category of permissible content regula-
tion, since neither would be erotic.
It may be necessary to distinguish between aiming at the indi-
vidual and aiming at the gender when considering the significance
of the libel category. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan?7 makes it doubtful that the First
Amendment will permit actions for group libel, although technical-
ly this question is still open." Hence, statements such as "all
women are whores" probably would be protected and could not
be used as evidence of a hostile environment.
Messages of hostility that take the form of making false state-
ments of fact about an individual (e.g., "She puts out to every-
body."), however, are a different matter.' "[T]here is thus no
constitutional value in false statements of fact," the Court has
said."° So there appears to be no objection to using such state-
ments in a hostile-environment case. Nor is there any reason to be
distracted by the complex set of New York Times rules about public
figures and actual malice. The only issue is whether the false state-
95 See infra Part V-D.
96 The speech "must be, in some significant way, erotic." Coher, 403 U.S. at 20.
97 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
98 For discussion, see NOWAY & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, at 1036 n.9.
99 See also Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 638 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (male su-
pervisor told a representative from another company that plaintiff "gave good service"
and suggested that the representative call plaintiff and make sexual advances); cf Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal upheld of civil service employee who fhlsely
accused fellow workers of accepting bribes).
100 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
1993]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ment may be used as evidence of a hostile environment. Resolving
that issue should not depend on whether the plaintiff is in some
sense a "public figure" or whether the speaker knew the statement
was false when he uttered it.
10 1
The fighting words category clearly does require a distinction
to be drawn between statements made about an individual and
those made of a group. The concept includes two key elements:
(1) The words must constitute a personal insult of a kind that
"tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace, "12 and (2)
the insult must be "directed to the person of the hearer" rather
than to some person not present."3 The latter element requires
that the words be addressed to an individual. The former element
poses some serious conceptual difficulties. How is the potential of
the words to incite an immediate breach of the peace to be mea-
sured? By the standard of a reasonable person? Many people be-
lieve that no conceivable set of words would ever cause a reason-
able person to start a brawl with a speaker. The problem with this
conclusion is that it seems to contradict the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chaplinsky that "fascist" is a term that would cause some
people to fight. Abandoning the reasonable person standard would
mean that any set of words might qualify as fighting words. Some
courts and commentators have argued in favor of using a "reason-
able woman," rather than a reasonable person, standard in hostile-
environment cases.' °4 What set of words would cause a reason-
able woman to start a brawl with a male speaker?
There is finally the difficulty of whether the category still
exists. As was pointed out earlier, Gooding and the cases following
it can be viewed as covertly overruling Chaplinsky.'0  On the oth-
er hand, the Minnesota courts construed the bias crime ordinance
at issue in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paulf to be limited to fighting
words. The Supreme Court rejected the state court's conclusion
that the ordinance could be limited to fighting words, but gave no
indication that the category had disappeared. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion hinted rather ambiguously that the fight-
101 See gvneraly NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, §§ 16.33-.35.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
103 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
104 See, e-., Eileen M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and
The Case for Subjecivi, 16 VT. L REv. 1005 (1992).
105 See supra Part III-A.
106 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ing words concept might be employed to uphold the validity of
the hostile-environment laws.
10 7
In sum, whether hostile messages directed at a particular
person may be viewed as unprotected fighting words and therefore
competent as evidence of a hostile environment is debatable. Tak-
en literally, the requirement that the words tend to incite an im-
mediate altercation would seem to exclude that possibility. But a
less rigorous definition would make the standard so elastic that
judges would have virtually unlimited discretion to accept or reject
the claim as they saw fit. That possibility may justify, by analogy to
the principle against overbreadth,'" a refusal to relax the literal
definition.
C. Sexually Suggestive Messages
Sexually suggestive messages can be conveyed in a variety of
ways. The most blatant, of course, is the outright sexual solicita-
tion or proposition. This would be an example of quid pro quo
harassment if the speaker is in a position of authority. Moreover,
it is a kind of speech that may be made a crime. In either event,
solicitations of sex are of no concern here because no argument
can be made that they are a protected form of speech.
The category of permissible content regulation that immedi-
ately comes to mind with respect to sexually suggestive messages is
obscenity. The test for obscenity laid down in Miller v. Califor-
nia 9 is:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct... ;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
10
Moreover, the words "must be, in some significant way, erotic.""'
The Court went on to provide "a few plain examples" of what
could be considered to be obscene: "(a) Patently offensive repre-
107 'Thus, for example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may
produce a violation of Title VU's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices." Id. at 2546.
108 See infra Part IV.
109 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
110 Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
111 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
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sentations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or per-
verted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals."
12
Many hostile-environment cases have concerned the use of
terms like "honey" and "dearie" when addressing women. Such
terms are obviously not obscene under Miller, are not libelous
(defamatory), and are not fighting words. The same conclusions
must be drawn regarding unsolicited compliments about a
woman's appearance, whether expressed verbally or symbolically
(such as whistles or leers'"), and about dirty jokes (not obscene
because not erotic). To be sure, many women consider communi-
cations like these to be demeaning. But many women consider at
least equally demeaning the use in their presence of words like
motherfucker and cocksucker, and yet Cohen forbids sanctioning
their use. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine how any brief combi-
nation of words, sentences, or even paragraphs uttered by one
worker to another in the workplace could ever be obscene under
the test laid down in Miller. There is, in short, no category of
permissible content regulation into which these objectionable
terms, some innocuous and some not, can be squeezed. It follows
that evidence of their use should not be admitted in hostile-envi-
ronment cases.
Not so with pictures, however. They can range from the ubiq-
uitous and clearly not obscene pinups to graphic displays that
would be obscene under almost anybody's interpretation of the
Miller standards. 4 The pictures either will or will not be ob-
scene. If they are, their display is not protected, and they mLy be
used to support a finding of a hostile environment.
The obscenity category was expanded slightly in New York v.
Ferben 5 to cover all material that graphically portrays juveniles
engaging in sex acts. But the focus of the Court was on protecting
the juveniles who were being exploited, not on suppressing the
offensive message the materials conveyed. Arguing that women in
112 Mer, 418 U.S. at 25.
113 Professor MacKinnon argues that such gestures create a hostile environment by
making a woman perpetually aware of her body. CATHERINE A. MACINNON, SEXUAL HA-
RASSMENT OF WORKING WoMEN 40 (1979).
114 See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (supervisor showed
black woman employee a photograph depicting an interracial act of sodomy and photo-
copies of pictures involving bestiality).
115 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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the workplace need the same kind of protection as juveniles would
seem to be inconsistent with the goal of securing equality.
116
In the end, of course, the objection to all of these sexually
suggestive communications is that they do indeed convey a mes-
sage and a point of view. Professor MacKinnon and others have
argued that the message is one of degradation and subjuga-
tion.1 7 But it is precisely because they convey messages and
points of view that they are protected.118 The fact that many,
even most, people find the messages offensive is no excuse, under,
established First Amendment principles, for suppressing them.
D. Innocuous Messages
It is impossible to imagine a theory under which innocuous
messages (e.g., "Even male chauvinist pigs need love.") 9 could
ever legitimately be suppressed because of their content.
IV. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
Apart from content neutrality, the other First Amendment
principles that cast doubt on the validity of the EEOC hostile-envi-
ronment guidelines are those of vagueness and overbreadth.
Vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not peculiar to the First
Amendment, but they have an especially pronounced effect on
free speech litigation.
The vagueness concept grows out of the procedural due pro-
cess requirement of notice. It focuses on any uncertainty or ambi-
guity in the language of the regulation. A statute is unconstitution-
ally vague if it fails to make clear to a person of normal intelli-
gence what is required or forbidden. In the due process context,
the vagueness doctrine normally applies only to criminal statutes; a
vague civil statute is corrected by judicial interpretation clarifying
the ambiguities. But in free speech litigation, the challenge of.
vagueness is available against civil statutes because civil penalties
116 See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amid Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 109
(1987).
117 Andrea Dworkin, Against the male [sic] Foo& Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8
HARv. WoMEN's UJ. 1 (1985); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
spdh. 20 HARV. C.R.C.L L REv. 1 (1985).
118 American Booksellers' Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aflld, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
119 But see supra note 48.
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may also effectively discourage protected speech. Despite this spe-
cial concern for precision, however, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that some uncertainty is inherent in the use of language.
Mathematical precision is not required even in a regulation of
speech.1
20
As its name suggests, overbreadth comes into play when a
regulation sweeps too broadly, including within its coverage not
only speech that legitimately may be prohibited but speech that is
constitutionally protected as well. Overbreadth focuses on the
regulation's potential for punishing or discouraging speech that is
protected. In the First Amendment context, the point is usually
made by saying that the regulation must be "narrowly tailored" to
limit its operation to legitimate spheres.
If the meaning of a regulation is uncertain, it is always suscep-
tible of being applied to protected speech. Hence an unconsti-
tutionally vague statute is inevitably unconstitutionally overbroad as
well. The converse is not true, however. A statute can be uncon-
stitutionally overbroad without being the least bit vague.
121
Because of the dramatic consequences that result from finding
a regulation unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face,1
22
the Supreme Court has begun pruning back the reach of that
doctrine. The landmark case is Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
2 3 which
upheld state laws that prohibited civil service employees from
engaging in political fund raising, becoming candidates for paid
political office, and similar activities. The Court emphasized two
points. First, the statute's overbreadth must be "real" and "substan-
tial" to make it vulnerable to invalidation.124 Second, the argu-
120 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
121 For example, the ordinance declared unconstitutional in Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960), required all school teachers to file an annual affidavit listing all orga-
nizations to which they belonged or contributed money in the last five years. The ordi-
nance was overbroad, but there was no vagueness about it.
122 Three serious consequences ensue when a regulation is unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad on its face. First, normal rules are relaxed to permit the regulation to be
challenged by litigants who otherwise would have no standing to do so. Second, the
overbroad regulation may not be applied to anyone, even someone whose speech legiti-
mately could have been restricted under a more precisely drawn regulation. Third, if a
regulation requiring a license is facially vague or overbroad, a person may ignore the re-
quirement, speak in violation of the regulation, and then defend against prosecution by
challenging the constitutionality of the regulation. See generally City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
123 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
124 Id. at 622.
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ment for overturning legislation on overbreadth grounds is weaker
in cases involving conduct rather than pure speech."z
In a later case, the Court elaborated on" the real and substan-
tial requirement, saying that "there must be a realistic danger that
the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to
be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds."2 '
The speech-conduct distinction in the Broadrick analysis in-
volves two separate but related considerations. The first is whether
the law explicitly regulates speech in terms or rather regulates
some aspect of conduct, like camping in a park, but is applied to
a speech-related activity such as a demonstration for example.
27
If the law does not in terms regulate speech, the second consider-
ation comes into play. When the claim is that the law is uncon-
stitutionally vague, the tendency appears to be to resist holding
the law vague on its face and to look chiefly to the question of
whether the law is vague in its application to the conduct at issue.
When the claim is that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad, the
Court appears to examine how closely related the claimant's con-
duct is to protected speech. The closer that relationship is, the
more likely the Court will be to disregard Broadrick and invoke
traditional overbreadth doctrine
28
The EEOC guidelines governing hostile environments provide
that "sexual harassment" is a form of sex discrimination forbidden
by the statute. The guidelines then define "sexual harassment" as
"verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" where the conduct
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive work environment."" r  The Supreme Court has
treated "these guidelines as authoritative and has said that they
afford employees "the right to work in an environment free
from . . . ridicule, and insult."'
125 Id. at 629.
126 Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 801 (1984).
127 Even if the law does in terms regulate speech, the Court may still invoke the real
and substantial requirement of Broadridc to preserve it. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982).
128 See, eg., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980).
129 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
130 Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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Using the overbreadth principles to evaluate the EEOC guide-
lines is relatively easy.' First, the guidelines specifically apply to
speech (i.e., "verbal conduct"). Not only that, they apply, in terms
and as authoritatively interpreted by the Court, to speech defined
by its content (e.g., "offensive") and prohibited because of the
messages it conveys (e.g., "ridicule and insult"). In holding the
bias-crime ordinance in R.A.V. unconstitutional, the concurring
Justices observed that the ordinance, as interpreted by the state
supreme court, made criminal "expressive conduct that causes only
hurt feelings, offense or resentment" and thus was impermissibly
overbroad."3 2 Precisely the same criticism may be levelled at the
hostile-environment law.
Second, except for false allegations of fact and obscene pic-
tures, which were rare occurrences in the cases, almost all the
varieties of speech that have been found to contribute to hostile
environments have also been held to be protected by the First
Amendment. This not only meets Broadrick's substantial over-
breadth requirement, but it is overbreadth run amok.
V. THE ESCAPE HATCHES
The issue that remains to be determined is whether any es-
cape hatches exist that might permit the guidelines to survive
despite their apparent vulnerability to content discrimination and
overbreadth charges. Four possibilities suggest themselves: (1) the
guidelines are simply regulations of the time, place, or manner of
the speech, which are subject to a less stringent constitutional
standard; (2) congressional power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce the guarantees of the equal protec-
tion clause legitimatize the guidelines; (3) the "captive audience"
doctrine permits the kind of speech at issue in the typical hostile-
environment case to be controlled; and (4) the workplace'is a
special environment that is not subject to the full panoply of free
speech principles.
131 Professor Browne argues that the guidelines are unconstitutionally vague. Browne,
supra note 1, at 502-10. His argument is reasonable, but not, in my view, especially com-
pelling. Since the guidelines clearly transgress the overbreadth principles, as detailed in
the text following this note, I have ignored the vagueness issue.
132 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2560 (1992).
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A. Time, Place, or Manner Regulation
Traditional constitutional analysis divides the universe of
speech regulations into two distinct classes: (1) those that regulate
speech because of its content, such as regulations of obscenity,
and (2) those that regulate activities in order to protect govern-
mental interests that are unrelated to the content of any speech
that may fall within their purview, such as a traffic regulation that
might be applied to parades. In an early case upholding the con-
stitutionality of an ordinance that required a permit and the pay-
ment of a fee to hold a parade, the Supreme Court described the
latter class as "time, place, and manner" regulations, 33 the title
by which they are still known.
The possibility that the EEOC guidelines might be upheld as
a time, place, or manner regulation is virtually nil. Such regula-
tions are required to be content,"M  or at least viewpoint,
1 3 5
neutral. These guidelines are anything but neutral.
B. Congressional Power to Enforce
Katzenbach v. Morgan,"5 6 one of the more controversial deci-
sions the Court has rendered, dealt with a challenge to a federal
law that in essence provided that no person who had completed
the sixth grade in a Spanish-language school in Puerto Rico could
be denied the right to vote in a state election on the ground of
illiteracy in English. The Court previously had rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to a state literacy requirement.3 7 Therefore, the
issue in Morgan was whether Congress could force a state to give
up its constitutionally permissible literacy requirement. The Court
held that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
the power to do so. ass
The majority offered two theories to support its decision.
Under its first theory, the Court suggested that Congress could
redefine the substantive content of the Fourteenth
133 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
134 United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
135 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Members
of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
136 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
137 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
138 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47.
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Amendment,"9 regardless of how the judiciary previously defined
it, and then legislate to enforce the rights it had created by its
own redefinition. Under this theory, as Justice Harlan's dissent
pointed out, it was theoretically possible for Congress to contract
as well as to expand constitutional rights."4 Replying in a foot-
note, the majority denied that Congress would have the power to
contract rights."" The majority claimed that since Congress' pow-
er was to enforce the amendment, it could not reduce any rights
previously declared by the Court."' That footnote became law in
Mississipoi University for Women v. Hogan."' Hogan rejected an ar-
gument that Congress could authorize a form of sex discrimina-
tion that the Court earlier had determined to be unconstitution-
Through the restrictions in Title VII, Congress would be sub-
stantially diminishing free speech rights that the Court over de-
cades has found to be protected by the First Amendment. Hogan
seems to preclude that possibility.
C. Captive Audience
The captive audience doctrine acts as a separate and distinct
justification for regulating speech. These regulations are pro-
mulgated to cover situations in which an unwilling listener cannot
avoid another's speech. The concept of captive audience was rec-
ognized by the Court in the 1940s. The Court upheld a regulation
of sound trucks that emitted loud and raucous noise, partly be-
cause people in their homes were "practically helpless" to escape
the intrusion.
1 46
Although the concept is an old one, it has been employed
139 Technically, the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment are imposed on
the states by reason of their "incorporation" in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See genera/!y NOwAK & RoTUNDA,
supra note 18, §§ 10.2, 11.6. Arguably, therefore, by purporting to enforce the due pro-
cess clause, Congress could re-interpret the free speech guarantees.
140 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667-68.
141 Id. at 651 n.10.
142 Id.
143 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
144 Id. at 732.
145 The most extensive textual treatment of the captive audience concept is that of
MELviLLE B. NimMsFt, NmFt ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02(F) (1984).
146 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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infrequently and then only under severe restrictions. Rejecting a
captive audience argument in Cohen v. California,147 Justice
Harlan said:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is... dependent upon a showing that substantial pfivacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader
view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilec-
tions. 48
In a later case, the Court added that an audience is captive "only
when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the de-
gree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure."
149
The Court's practice has been consistent with these state-
ments. The captive audience 'concept has been employed to sus-
tain restrictions of speech only when the speech somehow intrud-
ed into the home."5° A workplace is not a home.
The Court has yet to discover a situation outside the home in
which it was "impractical" for unwilling persons to avoid exposure
to offensive speech. Rather it has contented itself with smug-
ly-and fatuously-advising people to "avert their eyes" if they are
offended."'
Even if the Court were inclined to fashion a different captive
audience rule for the workplace, the present hostile-environment
147 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
148 Id at 21 (emphasis added).
149 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (citations omitted).
150 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep% 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Moreover, the
Court has rejected captive audience arguments even when the speech did intrude into
the home if it found that less restrictive measures were available to protect the home-
owner. -, eg., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
151 See eg., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
Hostile environment cases can involve either visual or aural speech. The Court has
come full circle in its reaction to them. It began with the notion that people could shut
out noise but not visual stimuli. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) ("radio
can be turned off, but not so the billboard or street car placard"). It ended at the oppo-
site pole. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) ("indecent" speech may be banned
from daytime radio); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) ("avert the
eyes" case); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (same); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1940) (sound trucks may be banned).
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law would not survive because it discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint. The Court has insisted that speech restrictions based on
the captive audience concept be viewpoint neutral.'52
An ongoing dispute in the hostile-environnient cases is wheth-
er a female plaintiff may legitimately claim to be discriminated
against when the environment she finds offensive existed at the
time she began work.' It seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will permit current captive audience doctrine, with its dog-
matic insistence that the unavoidable be avoided, to be invoked
on behalf of a woman who thrusts herself into harm's way.1M
Still, the four concurring Justices in R.A.V. suggested that the
captive audience concept might be used to support the federal
hostile-environment law. 5s
D. Workplace as Special Environment
A number of cases have focused on the legitimacy of speech
restrictions in situations in which there was some special relation-
ship, such as employer-employee, between the regulator and the
speaker. This adds an element to the free speech calculus that
operates in ways that are not entirely predictable.
5 6
On the one hand, it is clear that employees have a First
Amendment right to speak their minds in the workplace, at least
some of the time. Rankin v. McPheson5 7 dramatically demon-
strates this idea. McPherson was a probationary deputy constable
in a sheriff's office. While at work, she heard of the attempt to
assassinate President Reagan to which she said-to a co-worker, "'If
they go for him again, I hope they get him. ' ""58 Questioned
about her statement by the sheriff, she said it was not hyperbole,
but that she had meant it. The sheriff then fired her. The Court
held that the firing violated her right of free speech. A probation-
ary law enforcement officer has a First Amendment right'to ex-
152 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
153 For example, see the debate between the majority and the dissent in Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
154 The sexual and militaristic overtones of the textual statement did not pass unno-
ticed.
155 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2560 n.13 (1992).
156 To make the analogy to the hostile environment problem as close as possible, the
cases discussed here are those in which the speech was confined to the workplace and
was not intended for public consumption.
157 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
158 Id. at 380.
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press a hope that the President will be assassinatedl In other cases,
the Court held that a school teacher had a right to complain to
her superiors, but not to be insubordinate' and that an attor-
ney who "rudely and discourteously" complained to a court clerk
could not be disciplined for that single incident."6
On the other hand, it is equally clear that workers in the
workplace do not have the same latitude they have outside it. In
Connick v. Myers,' respondent assistant district attorney was
transferred from one job to another. After protesting without
success, Myers prepared a fourteen-item questionnaire that she
circulated to other assistants at work. She was fired for insubordi-
nation. The Court rejected her claim that her dismissal violated
her right to free speech. The majority viewed the matter as one of
internal office routine, with no First Amendment ramifications,
rather than as a "matter of public concern."162 In other cases,
the'Court upheld the dismissal of an employee who made false
accusations of bribery against his co-workers'" and upheld the
court martial of an officer who advised troops to disobey an order
to report for combat duty.'
These cases may establish two propositions. First, the First
Amendment does not forbid the government, as an employer
rather than as a legislature, to make special rules regulating em-
ployees that it could not impose on citizens generally. Second,
governments may authorize employers to make special rules that
restrict the speech of their employees. The precise extent to which
speech may be restricted in either situation, however, remains
uncertain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that the EEOC guidelines
which were promulgated to implement Title VII's prohibition
against sexual discrimination in the workplace are probably facially
unconstitutional because they violate the First Amendment's taboo
159 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
160 In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). This holding was based on the Court's supervi-
sory authority over lower courts. But since the matter was one of "public concern" (see
the discussion in the next paragraph of the text), I believe the result would have been
the same under the First Amendment.
161 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
162 Id. at 147.
163 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
164 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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against substantial overbreadth. Apart from the problem of over-
breadth, the analysis also suggests that the guidelines have been
applied unconstitutionally in many cases because they have been
used to approve findings of hostile environments that were based
on speech that is entitled to protection under the guarantees of
the First Amendment. These conclusions do not mean, however,
that free speech guarantees effectively foreclose the elimination of
all of the abuses that have contributed to finding hostile environ-
ments.
The First Amendment offers no shelter to many kinds of
abusive behavior. Conduct that has no significant communicative
component (e.g., urinating in plain view of a female employee)
and conduct that legitimately may be made criminal (e.g., fondling
a person of the opposite gender) are not protected, even when
the conduct conveys a message (e.g., mooning a fellow employ-
ee). " Various forms of pure speech are also unprotected: the
sexual solicitation, the false and defamatory statement of fact, and
the display of obscene graphics. These are some of the worst abus-
es and can be eliminated, without hindrance.
At the opposite pole are examples of speech that fall well
within the general rule of the First Amendment, namely, that
government may not suppress speech merely because it finds the
message offensive. Illustrations are using terms like "honey" and
"dearie," complimenting another's appearance, displaying sexually
provocative but nonobscene pinups, and telling dirty jokes. It is at
least arguable that emaployers, including the government qua employ-
er, could forbid any or all of these things in the workplaces under
their control. It is clear, however, that giving the government qua
lawmaker the authority to suppress these sorts of messages serious-
ly haims important free speech values.
Finally, debatable issues remain. One is with respect to fight-
ing words, a category of speech the Supreme Court continues to
say still exists. But Chaplinsky, the case which announced the dis-
covery of the category, is the one and only instance of fighting
words the Court has ever recognized. Leaving that difficulty aside,
it is unclear how one would draft a regulation prohibiting the use
of fighting words that would not be vulnerable to a charge of
165 The examples in parentheses are meant to be representative illustrations, not
exhaustive catalogs.
[Vol. 68:1003
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
unconstitutional vagueness. This is especially problematic if the
"reasonable woman" standard continues to spread.
Another debatable issue concerns profane and vulgar words,
the use of which is a frequent cause of complaint. The Court's
opinion in Cohen, which shielded profane and vulgar words from
attack, is one of its least convincing exercises in constitutional
exegesis. Hostile-environment cases offer an attractive vehicle in
which to pursue an argument that Cohen should be overruled.
Eliminating these expletives from the workplace almost certainly
would lessen the chances that women would find the environment
hostile.
Even if the federal government eliminated all the behaviors
that it clearly may and all of those mentioned above as debatable,
there remains a large residuum of protected speech that many
find objectionable and offensive. The First Amendment prohibits
governments, federal or state, from regulating the speech in that
residuum. If these varieties of speech are believed to make the
work environment intolerable, the solution would appear to be to
persuade employers to make their own regulations governing their
workplaces. Although it is unclear exactly how far employers can
regulate the speech of their employees, they plainly can regulate
more than governments qua lawmakers. In any event, the Supreme
Court's treatment of the First Amendment raises serious concerns
for the enforcement of hostile-environment sexual harassment
litigation.
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